Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh since 2005, Jesper Kallestrup earned his Ph.D. from the University of St. Andrews (Scotland), and is Visiting Professor of Philosophy here at Dartmouth this Summer Term. Before that, he was co-director of the research center NAMICONA at Aarhus University (Denmark) and a research fellow at Copenhagen University. He is the author of "Semantic Externalism" (Routledge, 2011) and co-editor of "Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction and Explanation" (Oxford University Press, 2008) and "New Waves in Philosophy of Mind" (forthcoming from Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Abstract. The hypothesis of extended cognition has been famously motivated by Clark & Chalmers’ classic ‘extended memory’ case, where the notebook of an Alzheimer’s patient (Otto) is claimed to play the functional role of biological memory storage, and accordingly, to be a part of Otto’s extended memorial process. In so far as the hypothesis of extended cognition is to hold water in epistemology, Otto must count as enjoying knowledge supported by memory no less than his counterpart who relies exclusively on a biological brain. It is shown however that it will be difficult to vindicate Otto’s attainment of memory-supported knowledge unless Otto positively endorses his extended process as reliable. But in light of this requirement, a novel and seemingly malignant variety of epistemic circularity materializes. We consider a range of replies to this kind of ‘extended’ epistemic circularity that infects the possibility of extended knowledge.

Free and open to all. Reception follows. Funded by The Mark J. Byrne 1985 Fund in Philosophy.